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The Legal
Rights of All
Living Things
How animal law can extend the
environmental movement’s quest for legal
standing for non-human animals

Stacey L. Gordon is an
associate professor at the
University of Montana School of
Law. She teaches animal law and
legal research courses. Gordon is
the chair of the Humane Society
of Western Montana Legislative
& Advocacy Committee, which
advocates for companion animal
welfare through education and
legislation.

This article is reprinted from “The Legal Rights of All Living Things:
How Animal Law Can Extend the Environmental Movement’s Quest
for Legal Standing for Non-Human Animals,” in What Can Animal Law
Learn From Environmental Law? (ELI Press, 2015).
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n 1971, Christopher D. Stone posed the question first to his students and then to a wider
audience, “Should trees have standing?”1 Although Stone’s question initially was meant
only to engage the students in his property
law course, Justice William O. Douglas brought
the question into the environmental law discourse when he cited Stone’s article in the dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton:2
The critical question of “standing” would be
simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental
issues to be litigated before federal agencies or
federal courts in the name of the inanimate
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded
by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the
subject of public outrage. Contemporary public
concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing
upon environmental objects to sue for their own
preservation.3

Stone wanted his students to consider changing
societal values regarding what was ownable, who
could own things, and the rights and duties associated with ownership—his point was that legal
developments fuel shifts in societal consciousness
and morality.4 When his students grew bored, he
asked them to ponder what the social consciousness would look like if nature had rights.5
More than 40 years later, modern legal discourse still struggles with this question, and
now the related one that is particularly relevant
here—what would it look like if animals had
rights?6 Animals are protected as part of the environment by statutes like the Endangered Species
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? and
Other Essays on Law, Morals, and the Environment (25th
anniversary ed. 1996).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972).
Id. at 741-42 (1972) (citing Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees
Have Standing: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 450 (1971)).
Stone, supra note 1, at vii-viii.
Id. at viii.
There is a debate among scholars and jurists regarding whether
animals have rights. One of the key points of Stone’s original
article was that natural objects did not have standing, but should.
Stone, supra note 1. On the other side of the argument, the court
in Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush simply stated without discussion that
animals have rights protected by federal and state laws, including
criminal statutes. 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004). Cass
Sunstein also observed that federal animal welfare statutes create
“an incipient bill of rights for animals.” Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. Rev.
1333, 1334 (2000).
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Act (ESA)7 and Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA).8 They are also protected in their own
right by statutes like the Animal Welfare Act.9
Nevertheless, courts struggle with the practicalities of these questions at the same time society
struggles with their moral implications.
Perhaps the more relevant question is not
should trees have standing, but do trees—or nonhuman animals10 —have standing? Despite a few
cases that have stated otherwise,11 animals do
not have standing in U.S. courts to enforce their
rights or even challenge actions that may injure
them or already have injured them. In limited
circumstances, people, either on their own or
through organizations, have standing to protect
the interests of animals,
but that is far from
guaranteed.
This chapter explores
the nuances in the development of environmental standing, looking
especially at the cases
that can inform animal
law. Because animals
are part of the natural
environment and some
statutes
protecting
animals, like the ESA
and MMPA, are often
characterized as environmental law statutes,
several of the critical
cases are already animal law cases, including the fundamental case of Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.12 For the purposes of understanding the
development of standing for natural objects, Part
I examines these cases in addition to traditional
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544.
Id. §§1361-1423h.
7 U.S.C. §§2131-2159.
Throughout this chapter, the term “animals” means nonhuman
animals.
Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107
(9th Cir. 1988) (“As an endangered species under the Endangered
Species Act (“Act”) . . . the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member of
the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings
its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right.”); Marbled
Murrelet (Brachyramphus marmoratus) v. Pacific Lumber Co.,
880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Loggerhead Turtle
v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D.
Fla. 1995). See also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1359.
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

environmental standing cases. Part II addresses
the lessons learned from those cases with an eye
toward increasing the success of standing arguments in the future. Part III discusses where the
jurisprudence of animal law standing will likely
diverge from environmental law in the future—
the developing idea that as sentient beings, animals should have some sort of legal personhood
status and thereby standing in their own right.

Standing Jurisprudence
“Standing” ensures that courts consider only
actual “cases and controversies,” as required by
Article III.13 In Lujan, the Court succinctly summarized the requirements of Article III
standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury that is concrete and particularized
and is actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical; (2) the
injury must be fairly
traceable to the defendant’s action; and (3) it
must be likely, instead
of speculative, that the
injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision
by the court.14 At their
most basic, then, the
elements of standing
are injury, causation,
and redressability, but courts have demanded
much more of each element.

Injury
The injury element is the most problematic for environmental plaintiffs. The irony of environmental standing
is that potential or actual injury to the environment
only matters to the extent that a person is harmed by
the damage. Going back to the constitutional “controversy” language, the requirement that the plaintiff
have a “personal stake” in the outcome ensures the
adverseness necessary for resolution in court.15 It is
13.
14.
15.
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Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 560-61.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972).
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not sufficient that the plaintiff is just interested in
environmental protection; some concrete interest
of the plaintiff must be at stake.16
It is this requirement that the injury be “concrete and particularized” that is a particularly
high bar for plaintiffs in environmental cases.
Although the environmental damage may be
widespread and may affect many people, the
plaintiff must show that the damage caused him
or her some specific injury.17 The recognition in
Sierra Club v. Morton that environmental degradation could constitute injury18 was crucial for
the future of environmental standing. “Aesthetic
and environmental well-being, like economic
well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society, and the fact that
particular environmental interests are shared
by the many rather than the few does not make
them less deserving of legal protection through
the judicial process.”19 The Sierra Club sued
under the Administrative Procedure Act for an
injunction to prevent the development by Walt
Disney Enterprises of a ski resort in the Mineral
King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. The
remoteness of the area would require construction of a road and a power line into the resort. It
was this remoteness and the resulting wildernesslike quality of the area that Sierra Club sought to
protect. The Court recognized that the development and the road would injure the aesthetic and
recreational values of those who used the area,
but nevertheless found that Sierra Club did not
have standing because it failed to show that any
of its members used the area or would be significantly impacted by the development.20
The Court noted that its holding requiring
individual concrete injury does not preclude
judicial review of injuries to the public interest. It
insisted, however, that those who have the most
at stake in protecting those injuries because of
their own direct injury are the ones who should
seek review.21 The Court revisited this idea from
a slightly different perspective in Massachusetts
v. EPA, noting that the fact that the injury is
“widely shared” does not minimize the injury to
the individual.22 In that case, the widely shared
injury is the effect of climate change. Massachusetts was able to establish the injury requisite
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 734-35.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 740.
Massachusetts,549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007).
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for standing because although the environmental effects of climate change are global, Massachusetts also suffered local injury, i.e., rising sea
levels are swallowing the state’s coastlines.23 As a
coastal landowner, the commonwealth suffered a
particularized injury.24 Massachusetts, then, had
standing to seek judicial review with potential
global impact.
A further irony of environmental standing is
that it is often based on aesthetic injury, which
will always be subjective, seemingly the antithesis of the required concreteness. In Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Glickman, the plaintiff sought
standing on the basis that he had an aesthetic
interest in observing animals, in this case several primates, living under humane conditions.25
The plaintiff had been an employee and volunteer of animal welfare and rescue organizations,
was trained in wildlife rehabilitation, and had
experience investigating complaints regarding
treatment of wildlife.26 Over the period of a year,
he visited a local animal park several times and
attested that his visits only stopped because his
health prevented them.27 During this time, he
complained about the living conditions of several primates.28 Based on these details, the court
granted standing. “The key requirement, one that
Mr. Jurnove clearly satisfies, is that the plaintiff
must have suffered his injury in a personal and
individual way—for instance, by seeing with his
own eyes the particular animals whose condition
caused him aesthetic injury.”29 On one level, the
plaintiff’s injury is purely aesthetic—his visits
to the animal park were to view the animals, to
watch them. Although not expressly, the court’s
holding encompasses a more expansive definition
of aesthetics, one that has a moral component.
Mr. Jurnove’s background reveals that his interest in protecting animals is deeper than viewing
them living under humane conditions; it is more
likely that his concerns regarding the living conditions of the primates come more from a moral
conviction rather than an aesthetic one.
The WildEarth Guardians 30 court also stretched
the concept of aesthetic injury. In that case, the
district court quite easily seemed to reach the
conclusion that the plaintiff’s statement that his
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 522.
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. App. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id. at 433.
WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Colo.
2011).
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enjoyment of eastern and central Wyoming was
injured by the impending disappearance of the
diving beetle because of failure to list them as
a threatened or endangered species.31 The court
found that the plaintiff demonstrated a concrete
and particularized injury despite his never having
seen a diving beetle in the area, as follows:
That Mr. Tuchton’s alleged injury is concrete
and particularized is beyond contention. Contrary to the Secretary’s argument, Mr. Tutchton need not allege that he has actually seen a
Diving Beetle or that the Diving Beetle is in
some way essential to his personal or professional well-being. He need only establish that
his enjoyment of the area is in some way dependent upon the continued existence of the Diving Beetle.32

The court cited Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife for the proposition that the desire to view
wildlife is a cognizable interest for purposes of
determining standing.33 This is probably a stretch
of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The court reasoned that it was not surprising the plaintiff had
never actually seen a diving beetle since his contention was that they were threatened or endangered.34 However, that reasoning is circular since
it is based on the merits of the case when standing was not yet established. It is unlikely this case
represents a real development in environmental
standing jurisprudence, though it is does demonstrate a lack of clarity regarding what constitutes an injury for standing purposes. Indeed, the
court blamed the Supreme Court for vacillating
“between expansive and limiting applications
of standing, often without discernible reason or
justification” and failing “to provide meaningful
guidance to lower courts.”35
The WildEarth Guardians court actually had
more trouble with the requirement that the injury
be actual or imminent. “Much of the confusion
over the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence arises from the determination of whether
a party’s alleged injury is ‘actual or imminent.’”36
The court pointed to the decisions in Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc.37 and Summers v. Earth Island Insti-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. n.6.
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1225.
528 U.S. 167 (2000).

tute 38 as being inconsistent, but nevertheless then
crafted a rule to reconcile them.39
The WildEarth Guardians court was correct
that the requirement of imminence is problematic, though probably more so for plaintiffs than
courts. In Lujan, plaintiffs failed to meet the
actual or imminent component of the injury test
because although they had visited the affected
area in the past and hoped to do so again in the
future, they had no specific plans to go back.40
In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the application of the ESA to only federally funded projects in the United States and on the high seas.
Specifically, they maintained that rehabilitation
of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile in Egypt
would endanger the Nile crocodile, and that an
Agency for International Development project
in Sri Lanka would endanger species including
the Asian elephant and leopard.41 Both plaintiffs
stated in their affidavits that they had visited
the affected areas in the past but only that they
intended to visit the areas again in the future and
hoped to see the animals.42 However, they had no
current concrete plans to do so and, in fact, civil
war in Sri Lanka vented one plaintiff from making such plans.43 The Court held:
They plainly contain no facts, however, showing how damage to the species will produce
“imminent” injury to Mses. Kelly and Skilbred.
That the women “had visited” the areas of the
projects before the projects commenced proves
nothing. As we have said in a related context,
“‘Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in
itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by
any continuing, present adverse effects.’”44

Imminence is not necessarily a temporal
requirement. Indeed, in the Lujan Court’s statement of the standing rule, it sets “actual or imminent” against “not conjectural or hypothetical,”45
which does not suggest temporality. The failure
of the plaintiffs in Lujan was not that they did
not have plans to visit the affected areas soon—it
was that they did not have concrete plans at all,
just the idea that they would like to return to
these sites.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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555 U.S. 488 (2009).
WildEarth Guardians, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 564 (internal references omitted).
Id. at 560-61.
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The plaintiff’s future plans were even more
tentative in Summers v. Earth Island Institute.46
In that case the original dispute was resolved
when the case was settled.47 The plaintiffs, however, sought to continue the case to challenge
the timber-salvage regulations in question with
regard to future projects and received an injunction in the district court invalidating five of the
regulations.48 After the Ninth Circuit upheld the
injunction, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Earth Island Institute
could still challenge the regulations. The Court
held that the plaintiff did not have standing in
part because the affidavits submitted based the
claim of injury on the fact that the plaintiff visited many national forests and planned to visit
many more. The Court stated:
There may be a chance, but is hardly a likelihood, that Bensman’s wanderings will bring
him to a parcel about to be affected by a project
unlawfully subject to the regulations. Indeed,
without further specification it is impossible to
tell which projects are (in respondents’ view)
unlawfully subject to the regulations.49

The result was different in Laidlaw, where
the plaintiffs easily established past use of the
affected area, but failed to show concrete plans
of future use. However, the Laidlaw Court concluded that the plaintiffs demonstrated injuryin-fact.50 In that case, the plaintiffs lived near
the affected area, had used the area in the past
for specific activities, and testified that the only
reason they no longer used the area and had no
plans to return to the area was fear of the harmful
effect of the pollution.51 The Court specifically
distinguished this holding from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Nor can the affiants’ conditional statements—
that they would use the nearby North Tyger
River for recreation if Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into it—be equated with
the speculative “‘some day’ intentions” to visit
endangered species halfway around the world
that we held insufficient to show injury in fact
in Defenders of Wildlife.52

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Summers, 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 495.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000).
51. Id. at 181-83.
52. Id. at 184.
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From Summers and Laidlaw particularly, the
court in WildEarth Guardians fashioned the following rule:
Where a party demonstrates repeated past usage
of the affected area, either by his proximity to
the affected area or repeated, habitual, even if
infrequent, visits, the likelihood that he will
return is readily established by reference to his
plans to continue past usage. . . . A party need
not demonstrate “concrete plans” to return.
In contrast, where a party does not live in the
immediate vicinity of the affected area and has
only demonstrated a sporadic history of past
visits, he must establish his intention to return
with more specificity. In essence, if not in name,
these standards allow courts a means of objectifying what is otherwise an inherently subjective
determination—the credibility of the affiant.53

This may, however, be a misreading of Laidlaw. The key factor in Laidlaw was likely not the
plaintiffs’ proximity to the affected areas, but
their explanations of why they no longer visited
the area. It was not their proximity that suggested
they would one day return to the area so much as
their statements of how they would like to continue to use the area if not for the pollution. Nevertheless, the rule does correctly suggest that the
court should consider (and the plaintiff should
therefore plead), the totality of the circumstances.

Causation
The second prong of the standing test requires
that the plaintiff’s injury be “fairly traceable” to
the defendant with no intervening third-party
cause.54 This element is far less problematic than
determination of injury but still raises some challenges for plaintiffs in environmental cases. In
both Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman55 and Massachusetts v. EPA,56 causation was
at issue and in both cases the courts found the
plaintiffs adequately showed causation, though
the dissents strongly objected.
In Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, one issue was whether the plaintiff’s injury
could be reasonably traced to the Secretary of
Agriculture’s Animal Welfare Act rules when
it was a third party, the animal park, who was
actually responsible for the living conditions of
53.
54.
55.
56.

WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (D.
Colo. 2011).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
154 F.3d 426 (D.C. App. 1998).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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the primates that caused the plaintiff’s aesthetic
injury. The plaintiff claimed that it was the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s failure to adopt
regulations that met the minimum standards of
the Animal Welfare Act that allowed the animal
park to continue to house animals under such
conditions.57 The court held that the plaintiff
met the causation element, noting that “Supreme
Court precedent establishes that the causation
requirement for constitutional standing is met
when a plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged
agency action authorizes the conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injuries, if that conduct
would allegedly be illegal otherwise.”58 In this
case, the agency’s actions in failing to promulgate
adequate regulations allowed the animal park to
keep animals under conditions that were illegal
under the Animal Welfare Act, thus causing the
plaintiff’s aesthetic injury.59 The dissent found it
“frightening at a constitutional level the majority’s assumption that the government causes
everything that it does not prevent.”60
In Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA did not dispute
that there is a causal connection between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.61 The
Agency claimed, however, that for the purposes
of standing analysis, its decision not to regulate
greenhouse gases from new automobiles was an
insignificant cause of the plaintiff Massachusetts’ injuries, especially given the predicted
rise in emissions from countries like China and
India.62 The Court disagreed, saying that it was
“erroneous” to assume “that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be
attacked in a federal judicial forum.”63 The relatively small contribution to the causation (from
new U.S. automobile emissions) in contrast to the
expansive scope of the problem (global warming)
sets an important benchmark in environmental
standing jurisprudence. This determination was
too tenuous for the dissent, however, which reasoned that Massachusetts could not show that
its injury—risk of loss of its coastline due to the
effects of global warming—was actually caused
by the very small impact from EPA’s failure to
regulate domestic automobile emissions, given

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d at 430.
Id. at 440.
See id. at 438.
Id. at 452 (Sentelle, Silberman, Ginsburg, LeCraft Henderson,
JJ., dissenting).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523.
Id.
Id. at 524.

that such regulations would only address a “fraction of 4% of global emissions.”64

Redressability
The final standing element, redressability,
requires that “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed
to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”65 In Lujan,
the Court held that in addition to failing to meet
the injury element, the respondents also failed to
establish redressability because it was not likely
the Court’s decision against the agency would
require the third-party funding agencies to participate in the consultation sought by the respondents.66 Respondents’ case against the Secretary
of the Interior sought to compel the secretary to
interpret existing ESA regulations requiring consultation regarding threatened and endangered
species as applying to overseas as well as domestic
projects.67 The hurdle that the respondents could
not overcome, according to the Court, was the
fact that the funding agencies were not parties
to the case themselves and were likely not bound
by the regulation.68 The respondents’ requested
remedy might redress the injury if the third-party
agencies chose to comply with the regulation, but
it was speculative that they would do so.
The respondents in Lujan also faced a secondary problem. The Court noted that the funding
agencies provided only a small fraction of the
funding for the projects at issue.69 Respondents
failed to show that if the requested consultation
happened and the funding agencies did not fund
the projects as a result, the projects would be suspended and cause no more harm.70
Contrast this scenario with the language from
Massachusetts v. EPA quoted above, which held
that small, incremental steps were sufficient to
establish redressability. In that case, the fact that
the U.S. auto emissions were only a small contributor to global climate change was still sufficient,71
whereas in Lujan the fact that U.S. agency funding was only a small part of the total funding of
the international projects was not.72 From a legal
standpoint, the distinguishing factor is the causa64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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Id. at 544-45 (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal
citations omitted).
Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 523-24 (2007).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571.
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tion versus redressability analysis. However, the
real key to the different treatment may be in the
pleadings. The respondents in Lujan failed to recognize that they needed to plead facts sufficient
to overcome the fractional impact of the defendant’s actions while the petitioners in Massachusetts succeeded in doing so.

Prudential Standing and Citizen Suits
Article III standing ensures that plaintiffs meet
the constitutional minimum elements to establish standing. Courts have added an additional
layer to the analysis that applies when there is no
statute granting the plaintiffs the right to seek
review of government action, though the Court
in Cetacean Community v. Bush also suggests that
the prudential standing test is applied when it is
unclear whether plaintiffs meet the test for injury
under Article III.73 According to Sierra Club,
absent such a statute, the plaintiff may still be
required to show that his interests fall within the
“zone of interest” protected by the statute.74 It is
an undemanding test—the plaintiff must show
only that his interests fall arguably within the
zone of interest protected by the statute.75 For
example, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, the court held that the individual plaintiff’s
interest in viewing animals living in humane
conditions met the zone of interest test for prudential standing.76 “The very purpose of animal
exhibitions is, necessarily, to entertain and educate people; exhibitions make no sense unless one
takes the interests of their human visitors into
account.” 77 One reading of the holding is that the
court was suggesting that the purpose of the Animal Welfare Act is to protect people. However, an
alternate reading confirms the expansive reach of
the zone of interest test; even if the main purpose
of the Animal Welfare Act is to protect, among
other animals, those living in zoos and exhibitions, people who want to view those animals
also fall within that zone of interest.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-34 (1972); see also
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. App. 1998). In
Sierra Club, the plaintiff was suing under §10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which grants the right to seek judicial review
to anyone who suffers an injury under a statute due to federal
agency action. 5 U.S.C. §702 (quoted in Sierra Club, 405 U.S.
at 732.) So, for example, in Animal Legal Def. Fund, the plaintiff
sued under §10 because the Animal Welfare Act has no citizen
suit provision. In discussing the “zone of interest” test, the court
refers to it as a “gloss” on §10. 154 F.3d at 444.
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d at 444.
Id. at 444-45.
Id.
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While Article III constitutional standing is a
mandatory requirement, prudential standing is
a judicially created requirement that is discretionary.78 There is, however, a major exception to
the prudential standing requirement that is especially important in environmental cases: where
Congress has provided a statutory “citizen suit”
provision, a plaintiff is relieved of the prudential
standing requirement.79 Major federal environmental statutes have citizen suit provisions allowing citizens to petition the courts for review of
actions under those statutes. For example, the
Clean Water Act authorizes any citizen to “commence a civil action on his own behalf ” against
any person or government agency for violation
of Clean Water Act standards or against EPA
for failure to perform its administrative duties.80
Citizen suit provisions do not automatically confer standing, however, and a plaintiff still has to
demonstrate a personal injury that is more than
a generalized grievance and that the government
failed to do something required by the statute.81
Because citizen suits are less common with animal protection statutes—only the ESA has a citizen suit provision82 —plaintiffs in animal welfare
standing cases typically will have to meet the
“zone of interest” test in addition to the Article
III elements.

Informational and Procedural Standing
In addition to substantive injuries, plaintiffs may
try to establish standing based on informational
or procedural injuries. To some degree, these concepts broaden the injury requirement for Article
III standing,83 allowing in plaintiffs who would
otherwise be barred, but these are not easy injuries to establish. Informational injuries are rooted
in statutes requiring agencies to provide information; their failure to do so may cause injury to
an organization whose purpose is to disseminate
that information.84 For purposes of informational standing, a plaintiff “is injured-in-fact . . .

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.

Sonia S. Waisman et al., Animal Law: Cases & Materials 285
(5th ed. 2014).
American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2011).
33 U.S.C. §1365(a).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
16 U.S.C. §1540(g).
Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of
Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-inFact After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. Envtl. L.
& Pol’y 345 (1994).
Id. at 349.
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because he did not get what the statute entitled
him to receive.”85
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yuetter,
where the Animal Welfare Act required reporting regarding compliance with AWA regulations
concerning treatment of laboratory animals, the
plaintiff claimed an informational injury because
the regulations failed to include rats, mice, and
birds in the definition of “animal,” making it
impossible for the plaintiff to obtain and disseminate information regarding those species.86 The
court elaborated on the requirements of informational standing: (1) that there is a link between
the agency’s actions and the organization’s activities; (2) that the information is essential to the
organization’s activities (though not necessarily
all of the organization’s activities); and (3) that the
organization’s interests must be within the zone
of interests protected by the statute.87 The parties
contested the second requirement: the plaintiffs
claimed that the lack of data regarding mice, rats,
and birds rendered their reporting to their members infeasible while defendants claimed that the
organization’s mission was advocating for better
conditions for all animals and that was not sufficiently hindered by the regulations.88
Plaintiffs initially won the argument with the
court saying that it is sufficient that “an activity
that is germane to the organization’s purpose be
significantly hindered.”89 However, the organization lost on appeal where the court held that
although the informational injury was sufficient
to establish Article III standing, the organization
nevertheless failed to meet the zone of interest
test. The court held:
The principle established by our decisions, then,
is that to come within the zone of interests of
the statute under which suit is brought, an organization must show more than a general corporate purpose to promote the interests to which
the statute is addressed. Rather it must show a
congressional intent to benefit the organization
or some indication that the organization is “a
peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative
neglect.”90

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2011).
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Yuetter, 760 F. Supp. 923 (D.D.C.
1991) (vacated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496
(D.C. Cir. 1994)) (cited in Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 352).
Id. at 926-27.
Id. at 927.
Id.
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 23 F.3d at 503.

Absent specific citizen suit provisions, this is a
tough showing.
In American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, the court
considered informational standing for an organizational plaintiff, but here too the plaintiff could
not meet the burden.91 This case was brought
under the ESA, which contains a citizen suit
provision.92 However, the plaintiffs brought the
case under §9 of the Endangered Species Act, the
takings provision.93 The court held that there is
no reporting requirement in §9 and therefore the
organizational plaintiff could not claim a right
to information based on that provision under
which it brought suit.94 The organization’s informational standing would only be triggered if the
defendant’s activities constituted a “take,” the
defendant failed to apply for a permit as required
in §10, and either the defendant failed to disclose
the information on the permit application or the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) refused to
make the information public.95
Procedural standing is grounded in an agency’s failure to comply with statutory procedural
mandates.96 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
federal appeals court originally upheld procedural standing based on the citizen suit provision
in the ESA, which provides that “any person may
commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to
enjoin any person, including the United States
and any other governmental instrumentality or
agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of
any provision of this chapter.”97 The Supreme
Court found far too broad the interpretation that
the statute confers standing on all persons who
just want to ensure the law is upheld. This is the
type of generalized grievance that the Court has
consistently rejected.98 The Court did suggest the
types of procedural injury that would support
standing: (1) cases where the disregard of the procedural requirement would injure a substantive
interest; (2) cases in which many persons have
suffered the same concrete injury; and (3) cases
in which a statute grants the plaintiff a “reward”
for bringing a case against another private party
that would benefit the government.99 The “take91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d
at 23-24.
Id. at 17, 19.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 353.
16 U.S.C. §1540(g) (quoted in Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-72).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
Id. at 572-73.
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away” from the Court’s reasoning is clearly “that
in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.”100
To ensure plaintiffs have more than a generalized interest, some courts have applied a “nexus
test” for procedural standing, requiring a sufficient geographical nexus to establish a concrete injury.101 The nexus test originated in City
of Davis v. Coleman¸102 a NEPA case, where the
court stated:
The procedural injury implicit in agency failure
to prepare an EIS—the creation of a risk that
serious environmental impacts will be overlooked—is itself a sufficient “injury in fact” to
support standing, provided this injury is alleged
by a plaintiff having a sufficient geographical
nexus to the site of the challenged project that
he may be expected to suffer whatever environmental consequences the project may have. This
is a broad test, but because the nature and scope
of environmental consequences are often highly
uncertain before study we think it an appropriate test.103

The court held that the city established,
because of its proximity to the contested project,
a highway interchange, that the city could “be
expected to suffer a wide variety of environmental consequences,” including damage to the water
supply.104
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit found standing for the plaintiffs in Oregon Environmental
Council v. Kunzman,105 who were challenging an
inadequate environmental impact statement that
allowed for spraying of pesticides to eradicate the
gypsy moth.106 The court reasoned:
The Secretary argues that to allow anyone to
bring an action to enforce compliance with
NEPA would allow even individuals in states
without gypsy moths to bring this action. This
case does not present such a situation. . . . In
this case, OEC’s members reside in a state with
an actual gypsy moth problem and thus may
challenge a nationwide EIS that is applicable to
them.107

Organizational Standing
Most of the above discussion suggests that the
plaintiffs were individuals, when in reality, virtually all of the plaintiffs in these cases were
organizations, which raises additional standing
requirements. An organization may have standing
based on injury to its members;113 however, with
one exception, organizations only have standing
if they can show (1) individual members have
standing; (2) the issue of the lawsuit is within the
mission of the organization; and (3) neither the
lawsuit nor the remedy require the participation
of individual members.114 This means the organization has to meet all of the requirements discussed above, with two additional elements. In
WildEarth Guardians, the court noted the special
problem that these additional elements can cause
in environmental lawsuits, which are often based
on federal regulations, stating:
In some contexts, most notably environmental
law, the party with the most significant stake
in the controversy, the organization that has
actually participated in the rulemaking pro-

100. Id. at 578.
101. Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Climate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33
Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 121, 126 (2008).
102. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 671 (cited in Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 354).
104. Id.
105. 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 489 (cited in Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 355).
107. Id. at 491.
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The nexus test may be broad, but Lujan demonstrates that it can still be an obstacle. The
plaintiffs’ purpose in Lujan was to challenge an
interpretation that allowed FWS to apply consultation regulations in the ESA only to domestic projects. Given the purpose of the case, it is
unlikely that any plaintiff could have established
a geographical nexus. The plaintiffs offered three
alternative nexus tests: “ecosystem nexus,” “animal nexus,” and “vocational nexus.”108 The ecosystem nexus test sought to extend geographical
nexus to anybody who uses any part of the contiguous ecosystem, but the Court noted that
precedent holding that use couldn’t even be “in
the vicinity” precluded that interpretation.109 The
Court rejected all three proposed tests.110 Despite
the challenges presented by Lujan, though, Abate
and Myers show that procedural and informational injuries are a cognizable basis for standing
in environmental and animal cases,111 particularly where informational and procedural injuries
are brought together.112

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565-67.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Abate & Myers, supra note 83, at 368-80.
Id. at 388.
Abate, supra note 101, at 127.
WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (D.
Colo. 2011).
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cess, lacks independent standing to seek judicial relief. Instead of ensuring that parties have
“a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy,” the modern conception of standing forces many environmental plaintiffs to rely
upon the “discrete injury” suffered by one of its
members, a party with at best a derivative stake
in the controversy, to establish their standing.115

The requirement that members have standing
negates the possibility of an organization pursuing a lawsuit based solely on the interests stated
in its mission. The Court in Sierra Club v. Morton
made it clear that a “mere ‘interest in a problem,’
no matter how longstanding the interest and no
matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to
render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or
‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the APA.”116
In other words, a generalized interest in the environment is not enough, but the recreational or
aesthetic injuries of members will suffice.117 However, once an organization establishes standing,
it can argue public interest as well.118 Sierra Club
failed to show that its members suffered the requisite injury, even aesthetic injury, because it did
not state facts showing that they used the area
at issue.119 Similarly, Earth Island Institute failed
to establish standing in its case challenging timber sale regulations in part because the member’s
alleged injury, on which the organization relied
to assert its standing, did not specify a particularized injury.120
An organization can establish standing without
having to rely on injury to its members by showing that “the defendant’s actions cause a ‘concrete
and demonstrable injury to the organization’s
activities’ that is ‘more than simply a setback to
the organization’s abstract social interests.’”121
Known as Havens standing, the organization
must show under this test that it suffered an
injury to its interest in promoting its mission
and that it expended resources to counteract that
injury.122 This standard seems a bit counterintuitive given the Court’s statement in Sierra Club v.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1224.
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
Id. at 734-37.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 735.
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495-96 (2009).
American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 25 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)).
122. Id. (citing Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136,
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

Morton that an organization’s “mere interest” in
an issue by itself is an insufficient basis on which
to claim an injury.123 In American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, the court clarified that to establish Havens
standing, the injury has to be “more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social
interests”;124 it must impact the organization’s
mission.125 In other words, it must be not just the
organization’s interests that are at stake, but what
it does in support of those interests.
In American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, the organization seeking standing claimed that the circus’s
use of bullhooks to control its elephants undermined the organization’s advocacy and education
efforts aimed at eliminating the use of bullhooks.126 Unfortunately, the court determined it
did not need to answer the question of whether
injury to an organization’s advocacy efforts was
sufficient injury for Havens standing because the
rest of the standing inquiry would fail at the causation element.127

States as Plaintiffs
After Massachusetts v. EPA, states present a special case in standing determinations. In that
case, the Court recognized that Massachusetts
had a special position for purposes of determining standing.128 As a quasi-sovereign, Massachusetts has sovereign interests, but not the ability
to defend those interests. “Massachusetts cannot
invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some
circumstances the exercise of its police powers
to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might
well be pre-empted.”129 Basing its decision on
the 1907 case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,130
the Court held that Massachusetts, as a property
holder, was entitled to special solicitude in the
standing analysis and established the requisite
injury for standing.131 The Court noted that this
special solicitude does not relieve the state of the
123. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
124. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d
at 25 (quoting Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379).
125. Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. United States,
101 F.3d 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id.
128. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 518-21 (2007).
129. Id. at 519.
130. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
131. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
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need to establish that it meets the injury, causation, and redressability elements of standing.132

Lessons for Animal Law
As with injuries to environmental resources, injuries to animals are redressable only if humans are
injured as well.133 Statutes purport to provide
for welfare and protection of animals, but only
humans can seek enforcement of those statutes.
Moreover, only humans who themselves have a
stake in the outcome of the case can even pursue a case. With that in mind, the line of environmental standing cases, and the smattering of
animal standing cases among them, offer insight
into how plaintiffs can strengthen their standing
cases.

Pleadings Matter: It’s in the Details
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
standing.134 Furthermore, the plaintiff retains the
burden of sustaining standing throughout the
various stages of the case. For example:
Since they are not mere pleading requirements
but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in
the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the
manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation.135

Although general allegations are sufficient initially, on summary judgment, specific facts must
be stated in the affidavits. If the case goes to trial,
standing must be established through evidence.136
In both Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Court noted
the plaintiffs’ failure to plead sufficient details to
establish standing from the beginning. In Lujan,
the plaintiffs’ affidavits “plainly contain[ed] no
facts . . . showing how damage to the species
will produce ‘imminent’ injury to Mses. Kelly
and Skilbred.”137 The situation was slightly different in Summers. In that case, although an initial affidavit did contain facts showing that the
individual plaintiff had specific plans to visit
the site of the timber sale, that issue was settled.
132. Id. at 521-26.
133. See Joanna B. Wymyslo, Standing for Endangered Species: Justiciability
Beyond Humanity, 15 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 45 (2007).
134. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 564.
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Another individual plaintiff filed an affidavit
that he had suffered injury in the past, but “[t]
hat does not suffice for several reasons: because
it was not tied to application of the challenged
regulations, because it does not identify any particular site, and because it relates to past injury
rather than imminent future injury that is sought
to be enjoined.”138 The plaintiff did allege that he
planned future trips to national forests, but the
Court determined that “[i]t is a failure to allege
that any particular timber sale or other project
claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan
of Bensman’s to enjoy the National Forests.”139
There was an additional problem in that case for
the organizational plaintiff. The Sierra Club did
not file individual affidavits of its members and
therefore did not show with evidence sufficient
for the purposes of standing that it had members
who used and enjoyed the Sequoia National Forest.140 The Court wanted not just an affidavit from
the organization describing its members’ activities, but also affidavits from individual members.
Contrast the details provided in the affidavits
filed in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman.
The plaintiff established that he was trained in
wildlife rehabilitation and had spent many years
in animal rescue.141 Furthermore, he established
that between specific dates he visited the animal
park a specific number of times and gave a reason
for not continuing those visits.142 He even established how long each visit lasted and what he
witnessed during those visits.143 Finally, he stated
that he planned to reinstate his visits within a few
weeks and to continue them into the future.144
The plaintiff gave sufficient detail that the court
was able to find standing.145
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals v. Feld Entertainment highlights how
important the details are at all stages of the litigation. At the earliest stages of the litigation, the
individual plaintiff pled facts that established
“emotional attachment, coupled with his desire
to visit the elephants and his ability to recognize
the effects of mistreatment” that was sufficient to
establish the necessary injury-in-fact.146 However,
after a trial that lasted six weeks, the trial court
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 495 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 499.
154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. App. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 435.
659 F.3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2011).
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found that the plaintiff was not credible and that
the evidence presented failed to establish that he
was injured.147 Among the facts the court noted
against him: he was a paid plaintiff, he disparaged the elephants and failed to take advantage
of opportunities to visit them, he could not identify the elephants to which he claimed an attachment, and he used bullhooks in working with the
elephants, casting doubt on his claim that he did
not want to witness any more mistreatment.148
Reviewing this evidence, the district court, in
very detailed and sometimes strongly worded
Findings of Fact, found that the plaintiff failed
to establish the emotional attachment on which
he based his claim of injury.149 The appeals court
upheld the determination, concluding:
Although at the pleading stage general factual
allegations may suffice to establish standing, “[i]
n response to a summary judgment motion . .
. the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere
allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or
other evidence specific facts.” Where, as here,
standing remains an issue at trial, the plaintiff’s burden is higher still: the facts establishing
standing must be “supported adequately by the
evidence adduced at trial.”150

Much was at stake in this case. Since plaintiffs
also failed to establish organizational standing,
everything was riding on the individual plaintiff. Had plaintiffs won, Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus would have been forced
to change its treatment of elephants. As it was,
after plaintiffs failed to establish standing, Feld
Entertainment won a settlement of $16 million
to cover its litigation costs.151

Extending the Holdings
The environmental standing cases are complicated and nuanced. Because standing is a constitutional threshold, courts provide detailed and
carefully considered opinions. Equally careful
reading of these opinions, especially in conjunction with each other, reveals where courts may be
147. Id.
148. Id. at 20.
149. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld
Ent., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2009).
150. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 659 F.3d
at 19 (internal citations omitted).
151. Thomas Heath, Ringling Circus Prevails in 14-Year Legal Case; Collects
$16M From Humane Society, Others, Wash. Post, May 16, 2014,
at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/ringling-circus-prevails-in-14-year-legal-case-collects16m-from-humane-society-others/2014/05/16/50ce00b8-dd1511e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html.

willing to go a little farther. Even dissents provide
clues into where courts may be willing to go given
the right set of facts. The discussion that follows
addresses some examples that broaden some of
the language in existing cases in ways that could
enhance standing in animal cases.

Aesthetic Injury
The Court’s recognition of aesthetic injury in
Lujan was crucial for environmental standing,
and for many animal law cases it works as well—
being able to view animals in their natural environment is an aesthetic interest.152 Courts seem
poised to extend the aesthetic injury doctrine.
Arguably, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. already goes
beyond a strict interpretation of aesthetic injury.
In that case, the Court found that the plaintiffs
established injury-in-fact based on their perception that the river was polluted.153 Also, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, the court’s
determination that aesthetic injury includes viewing captive animals living in humane conditions
seems to stretch the concept of aesthetic injury.
Humaneness is more of a moral idea than an aesthetic one. Indeed, the dissent had trouble with
extending aesthetic injury. “Humaneness, like
beauty, is in the eye of the beholder: one’s individual judgment about what is or is not humane
depends entirely on one’s personal notions of
compassion and sympathy. I find it difficult to
imagine a more subjective concept than this.”154
Further, in American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, the district court was willing to recognize the individual
plaintiff’s emotional attachment to the elephants
as an aesthetic injury.155
Courts appear to be prepared to recognize moral injuries.156 Cass Sunstein makes the
point that statutes like the Animal Welfare Act,
enacted along with at least 50 other statutes that
demonstrate commitment to some form of animal rights, added a cause of action for the protection of animals where none existed before.157
Enacting these statutes in the first place reflects
152. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C.
App. 1998).
153. 528 U.S. 167, 183-85 (2000) (cited in Sunstein, supra note 6, at
1351).
154. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 154 F.3d at 448 (Sentelle, Silberman,
Ginsburg, LeCraft Henderson, JJ., dissenting).
155. American Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld
Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2011).
156. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1353.
157. Id. at 1354.
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a moral development regarding treatment of animals in society. Therefore, it would not be too
much of a stretch for courts to apply the same
moral consideration. Standing jurisprudence
continues to evolve. Environmental protection is
a relatively recent societal development. Environmental standing based on aesthetic, recreational,
and conservational injuries is even more recent,
though at this point it is solid (if a little convoluted) jurisprudence. It is only a matter of time
before society’s evolving values regarding animal
welfare translate into courts applying moral considerations to the standing analysis.

Public Trust
The special solicitude doctrine from Massachusetts v. EPA raises the potential that states could
more easily gain standing to protect at least some
animals if they were also willing to recognize a
duty under the public trust doctrine to protect
wildlife for the benefit of the citizens of the state.
Going back to the 1892 case Illinois Central R.R.
v. Illinois, the public trust doctrine holds that the
state’s sovereign ownership of natural resources
must be exercised for the public good.158 The
Court based this public trust on states obtaining sovereign ownership of navigable waters
upon statehood.159 Over time, the public trust
expanded to include waters that are not navigable160 and uses beyond the the traditional “triad”
of public trust uses, which included fishing, navigation, and commerce.
As society has changed, more recent cases have
expanded the traditional common law public trust
doctrine even farther in two directions. First,
courts have expanded the trust res. While early
public trust cases focused on submersible lands,
more recent cases have added, “water, wetlands,
dry sand beaches, nonnavigable waterways.”161
Second, courts have also expanded the traditional uses to include environmental, aesthetic,
and recreational interests.162 Both scholars and
courts reiterate the idea that “[s]uch expansion is

158. 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892) (cited in Michael C. Blumm &
Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 Utah L. Rev.
1437, 1440 (2013).
159. Id. at 456 (quoting Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410
(1842)).
160. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 158, at 1442.
161. Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International
Approaches 99, 104 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky
eds., 2009).
162. Id.
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well within the function of common law to adapt
to emerging societal needs.”163
With this in mind, scholars have argued for
a public trust in wildlife.164 Forty-eight states
already claim state ownership of wildlife,165
which is analogous to state ownership of navigable waters. Nevertheless, only a few states have
gone one step further to also expressly include
wildlife in the public trust, though most states
have at least employed some form of trust in
judicial opinions on the issue,166 making it seem
that states have all but adopted a public trust
doctrine for wildlife. A California appeals court,
for example, found a public trust in wildlife in
that state in a case regarding protection of raptors and other bird species from wind turbines.167
However, in doing so, the court distinguished
between traditional common law public trust and
a statutory public trust, which is what it applied
to wildlife.168 This leaves open the question of
whether there is a common law public trust in
wildlife in California. But returning to the holdings that the public trust doctrine is expandable
as public interests change, it seems likely that
eventually wildlife will be covered by a more
explicit public trust. At that point, states could
employ the Court’s “special solicitude” reasoning
from Massachusetts v. EPA, which was based on
the idea that “‘the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in
all the earth and air within its domain. It has
the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall
breathe pure air.’”169

Risk
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA provided an
additional opportunity for those seeking standing
163. Id. (citing In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1086-87 (Or. 1924)); see
also National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County,
658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (quoting Marks v. Whitney, 491
P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)).
164. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 158, at 1470. See also Deborah
G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines:
Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Times, 16 Pub. Land L. Rev. 87
(1995); Elise C. Pautler, Student Work, Defending Florida’s Marine
Treasures: An Argument to Expand the Public Trust Doctrine and
Reinforce Florida’s Role in Coral Reef Protection, 43 Stetson L. Rev.
151 (2013).
165. Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 158, at 1440.
166. Id. at 1471-79.
167. Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 166 Cal.
App. 4th 1349 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
168. Id. at 1354 (citing Environmental Prot. & Info. Ctr. v. California
Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2008)).
169. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-19 (2007) (quoting
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
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in animal welfare cases: in its discussion of special solicitude the Court recognized that risk of
injury meets the Article III injury-in-fact requirement.170 This was not the first time that courts
recognized risk of harm as injury and in fact it is
discussed less in this case than in previous cases.171 In Northwest Environmental Defense Center
v. Owens Corning Corp., the court concluded that
“a plaintiff need not wait until after he has been
harmed before seeking relief, particularly when
the injuries are of a kind not readily redressed
by damages.”172 Previous to that, in Delta Water
Agency v. United States, the Ninth Circuit recognized not only that a “credible threat of harm is
sufficient to constitute actual injury for standing purposes,” but even applied that principle
to animals in noting, “The extinction of a species,
the destruction of a wilderness habitat, or the
fouling of air and water are harms that are frequently difficult or impossible to remedy.”173 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court stated without
any discussion that risk of injury was sufficient as
though the idea was well-established.174 This basis
for establishing injury is crucial when the continued existence of a species is at stake: extinct is
forever and courts cannot change that outcome
regardless of the remedy.
The geographical nexus test for procedural
standing still requires a localized harm.175 In Massachusetts v. EPA, Massachusetts was able to show
that global climate change caused a risk of loss of
the Massachusetts coastline. A state would have
to be able to show that an agency’s actions would
cause harm to a species existing locally, even if
the harm itself was not localized. For example, a
state with a population of a threatened bird species might be harmed by EPA permitting use of
a specific pesticide that will kill the bugs that the
birds eat, or by global climate change that kills
off those same bugs.

Citizen Suits
Congress could grant standing to animals.176 For
example:

170. Id. at 521.
171. See Abate, supra note 101, at 130-37.
172. 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006) (cited in Abate, supra note
101, at 135).
173. 306 F.3d 398, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (cited in
Abate, supra note 101, at 132).
174. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
175. See Abate, supra note 101, at 155.
176. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004).

We see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from authorizing a suit in the name of an
animal, any more than it prevents suits brought
in the name of artificial persons such as corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships,
or of juridically incompetent persons such as
infants, juveniles, and mental incompetents.177

Cass Sunstein notes that both people and
animals could have standing to the extent Congress grants it, but Congress has chosen not to
grant standing to animals.178 In fact, in most animal protection statutes, Congress failed to even
include any citizen suit provisions at all.
The one animal protection statute with a citizen suit provision, the ESA, contains a broad
grant that allows “any person” to bring a suit
under the statute,179 as follows:
The term “person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any
other private entity; or any officer, employee,
agent, department, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any
foreign government; any State, municipality,
or political subdivision of a State; or any other
entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.180

However, the court in Cetacean Community held
that this definition does not authorize animals to
bring suit.181
One scholar suggests there are two problems
with Cetacean Community. First, the court should
not have determined so readily that its own seeming grant of standing to the Hawai’ian palila was
dicta, and second, that the court misinterpreted
the ESA citizen suit provision when it held that
it precludes animals from having standing.182
Wymyslo’s discussion highlights the confusion
created by the inconsistent jurisprudence of ESA
standing.
It will likely take a series of cases to untangle
the confused judicial precedent. But Congress
could quite easily solve the issue by amending the
ESA to include animals in the citizen suit provision.183 Moreover, Congress should amend the
ESA to effectuate its original intent, which contemplated the “use of all methods and procedures
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Id. at 1176.
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1335.
16 U.S.C. §1540(g).
Id. §1532(13).
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004).
Wymyslo, supra note 133, at 55-59.
Id. at 59.
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which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which
the measures provided pursuant to this chapter
are no longer necessary.”184 The current doctrine
of standing under the ESA focuses on injuries
to people, not to animals. But “[i]t is ‘beyond
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.’ This
cannot occur until the legislature grants species
standing.”185
Wymyslo makes a solid argument for standing
under the ESA, which already has a citizen suit
provision. Sunstein believes that Congress will
soon grant standing to animals,186 but it may be
more plausible that Congress will first add citizen suit provisions to allow people to more easily establish standing under the statutes. What is
clear is that congressional action is key to relaxing standing requirements for injuries to animals.
To the extent some form of activism is required
to effect the change, it may be Congress, not the
courts, that should be the focus of the activity.

Personhood
Regardless of how much those litigating for
animal welfare can learn from environmental
protection lawsuits, perhaps the best hope for
broadening standing in animal welfare cases is
to give standing to the animals themselves. This
is not an entirely implausible idea.187 Courts have
already allowed animals as named plaintiffs, and
the Ninth Circuit at least for a while left open
the possibility that it had allowed standing to
an animal.188 In Palila, the court simply stated
that the Hawai’ian palila, a bird species, “has
legal status and wings its way into federal court
as a plaintiff in its own right.”189 Although subsequent cases used Palila as the basis for standing
for other animals,190 that is actually a misreading of the case. Since only one plaintiff has to
have standing, there can be additional plaintiffs
that do not have standing. As the court finally
explained in Cetacean Community v. Bush, after
requesting briefing, that language was dicta—
184. 16 U.S.C. §1532(3).
185. Wymyslo, supra note 133, at 60 (quoting Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of
Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (D. Haw. 1986)).
186. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1359-60.
187. Id. at 1359-61.
188. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106
(9th Cir. 1988).
189. Id. at 1107.
190. Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus marmoratus) v. Pacific Lumber
Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (cited in Cetacean
Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173); Loggerhead, 896 F. Supp. at 1177 (also
cited in Cetacean Cmty, 386 F.3d at 1173).
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the litigation had been extensive and this was the
court’s fourth opinion in the case; other parties
had standing, and standing had never been an
issue.191 The court stated that their statements
were “little more than rhetorical flourishes.”192
However, the fact that the court later requested
briefing on its own language suggests it was at
least willing to consider the legal merit of that
language.
At the same time, the court did not immediately dismiss the idea of standing for animals. The
only issue before the court in Cetacean Community v. Bush was whether cetaceans had standing
to sue in their own names under various federal
statutes, including the ESA and MMPA.193 The
court began its analysis with this statement:
“Article III does not compel the conclusion that a
statutorily authorized suit in the name of an animal is not a ‘case or controversy.’ As commentators have observed, nothing in the text of Article
III explicitly limits the ability to bring a claim
in federal court to humans.”194 The question the
court analyzed then was whether Congress had
passed a statute granting standing.195 After analyzing specific language in each of the statutes,
the court determined that none granted standing to animals.196 Nevertheless, the statement
that Article III itself does not preclude standing
for animals remains. After having to explain its
earlier “rhetorical flourishes,” the court could not
have made that statement lightly.
But under Cetacean Community, animals do
not have standing until Congress grants it to
them. The Nonhuman Rights Project is working
in the courts to change the common law doctrine
that animals are not legal persons.197 Scholars
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1176-79.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) tried another
approach in Tilikum v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 842 F. Supp.
2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012). PETA argued that Tilikum and four
other orcas used by SeaWorld were enslaved and should be freed
under the Thirteenth Amendment. PETA did not claim personhood status for the orcas, but instead relied on the language of
the Thirteenth Amendment that does not specify that it applies
only to persons. The court held that the Thirteenth Amendment
only applies to humans and in doing so denied standing because
the plaintiffs’ injuries could not be redressed by the Thirteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1264. However, one very short line of dicta at
the end of the opinion recognizing that “the goal of Next Friends,
in seeking to protect the welfare of orcas is laudable,” id., supports
the contention that societal attitudes necessary to support the
expansion of aesthetic injury to include moral considerations,
and the expansion of public trust to include wildlife, are indeed
changing.
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have explored this idea for many years and posited that at least some animals should be classified
as legal persons and thereby have legal rights of
their own.198 The Nonhuman Rights Project has
filed the first cases seeking judicial recognition of
legal personhood status for at least some animals.
All four cases (in three courts) were habeas corpus actions filed in New York State trial courts
on behalf of individual chimpanzees.199 All three
courts dismissed the cases200 on different grounds,
but none closed the door. Instead, they included
language suggesting they were sympathetic to
the petitions.201 The intermediate appeals courts
upheld the trial courts’ decisions, though one did
so on alternate grounds and did not hold that
animals are not legal persons.202 The Nonhuman
Rights Project is appealing these cases further.203
In a momentarily exciting twist, it appeared that
a New York Supreme Court judge recognized two
of the chimpanzees, Hercules and Leo, as legal
persons when she granted their writ of habeas
corpus and issued an order to show cause.204
198. Emma A. Maddux, Comment, Time to Stand: Exploring the Past,
Present, and Future of Nonhuman Animal Standing, 47 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 1243, 1257-59 (2013); see, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Animal
Thing to Animal Person: Thoughts on Time, Place and Theories, 5
Animal L. 61 (1999).
199. Verified Petition, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, No. 32098/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 2013) (available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.
org/2013/12/10/legal-documents-re-hercules-and-leo/); Verified Petition, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v.
Lavery, No. 2051/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Fulton County 2013)
(available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/02/
legal-documents-re-tommy-kiko-hercules-and-leo-2/); Verified
Petition, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti,
No. 151725/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Niagara County 2013) (available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/10/
legal-documents-re-kiko-the-chimpanzee/).
200. Press Release, Nonhuman Rights Project Advances to New York Appellate Courts in Three Chimpanzee Rights Cases, (Dec. 10, 2013),
available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/10/
press-release-on-ny-judges-decisions/.
201. Id.
202. Memorandum and Order, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex
rel. Kiko v. Presti, No. CA 14-00357 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 2,
2015 (available at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Clerk/
Decisions/2015/01-02-15/PDF/1300.pdf ); Opinion and Order,
New York ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, No. 518336
(N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2014) (available at http://decisions.courts.
state.ny.us/ad3/Decisions/2014/518336.pdf ); see Lawsuit Refiled
on Behalf of Hercules and Leo, Nonhuman Rights Project (Mar.
23, 2015), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/03/23/
lawsuit-re-filed-on-behalf-of-hercules-leo/.
203. In “Tommy” Case, NhRP Seeks Appeal to New York’s Highest Court,
Nonhuman Rights Project, Dec. 18, 2014, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2014/12/18/in-tommy-case-nhrp-seeksappeal-to-new-yorks-highest-court/, NhRP Files Motion for Leave
to Appeal to Court of Appeals in Kiko’s Case, Nonhuman Rights
Project (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.
org/2015/04/20/nhrp-files-motion-for-leave-to-appeal-to-courtof-appeals-in-kikos-case/.
204. Order to Show Cause and Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman
Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley, No.

Just hours later, however, the judge amended her
order, striking the writ of habeas corpus and issuing only the order to show cause.205 While these
cases continue to make their way through the
New York appeals courts, the Nonhuman Rights
project also plans to file additional cases.206
The legal implications of personhood status
for animals are far-reaching. Although standing
would not be automatic, legal personhood would
entirely change the analysis for some animals.
For those animals, the conclusion in Cetacean
Community v. Bush, based on animals not being
persons as required by the citizen suit provisions,
would be reversed. Even absent citizen suit provisions, animals would no longer have to rely on
what is essentially a third-person’s injury. Scholars have contemplated the practical ramifications
of personhood status and found standing not to
be problematic given that we already use guardians for humans who cannot press their own cases
such as children and the disabled.207 Standing for
at least some nonhumans would not be the procedural disaster that opponents fear.
But courts are not there yet.208 In the United
States, only New York courts have had the

205.

206.

207.
208.
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152736/15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 20, 2015) (available at https://
iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?docum
entId=4D9287VfBiI66TYZPi4P1w==&system=prod); Judge
Recognizes Two Chimpanzees as Legal Persons, Grants Them Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman Rights Project (Apr. 20, 2015).
Amended Order to Show Cause, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc.
ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley, No. 152736/15 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 20, 2015) (available at http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Amended-Order-toShow-Cause-Hercules-and-Leo.pdf ); Update on Hercules and
Leo Order to Show Cause, Nonhuman Rights Project (Apr.
21, 2015, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/04/21/
update-on-hercules-and-leo-order-to-show-cause/.
Nonhuman Rights Project, About the Project, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/about-the-project-2/ (last visited May
3, 2015). To follow both the New York cases and any additional
cases, see Nonhuman Rights Project, Court Cases, http://www.
nonhumanrightsproject.org/category/courtfilings/ (last visited
May 14, 2015). This website contains both primary source court
documents and news updates on Nonhuman Rights Project cases.
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1365.
In December 2014, worldwide news sources reported that a court
in Argentina declared that an orangutan named Sandra was, as a
non-human person, being held illegally. E.g., Court in Argentina
Grants Basic Rights to Orangutan, BBC, Dec. 21, 2014, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30571577. However, once the
decision was translated, it appeared that although the court said “[t]
hat based on a dynamic rather than static interpretation of the law,
it is necessary to recognize the animal as a subject of rights, because
nonhuman beings (animals) are entitled to rights, and therefore their
protection is required by the corresponding jurisprudence,” it did
not grant the habeas corpus petition, so Sandra’s status is unclear.
Copy & Translation of Argentine Court Ruling, Nonhuman Rights
Project, Dec. 23, 2014, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.
org/2014/12/23/copy-of-argentine-court-ruling/. Previously, in
2010, the “Helsinki Group” drafted the Declaration of Rights for
Cetaceans: Whales and Dolphins, recognizing the personhood of
all cetaceans. Helsinki Group, Declaration of Rights for Cetaceans:

J U LY / A U G U S T 2 0 1 6 | 59

opportunity to even consider legal personhood
for animals, and only for chimpanzees.209 This is
probably not the easiest way to gain standing for
animals, but it would be the most concrete way
to ensure somebody has standing in those cases
in which, right now, standing is elusive.

Conclusion
Animals and the natural environment are in
much the same position with respect to seeking
redress for injury. Their own injury is not sufficient and they have to rely on a corresponding
human injury. Only if there is a human injury will
anybody have standing to bring the lawsuit. Even
then, establishing standing is not easy, nor are the
requirements especially clear. Beyond the basic
elements of injury, causation, and redressability,
there seems to be much in the environmental
standing doctrine (which includes animal standing cases) that is malleable or at least changeable.
This leaves room for people seeking standing in
animal cases to not only learn from the previous
cases, but to argue to extend them. However, the
best hope may not be in judicial decisions regarding standing but in congressional grant of standing to either persons or animals through citizen
suit provisions. Citizen suit provisions have made
it easier for environmental plaintiffs to establish
standing, but they are mostly still nonexistent for
animal plaintiffs. A further hope lies in an idea
that is not open to environmental elements: the
idea of personhood for at least some animals. As
sentient beings, animals may one day have direct
access to the courts when they are injured.
The aspect of a changed legal status for animals may be relatively new, but Justice Douglas
eloquently answered Professor Stone’s question
and foreshadowed the idea that natural objects,
including animals, should have standing. He
stated:
Whales and Dolphins http://www.cetaceanrights.org/ (last visited
May 3, 2015) (cited in Maddux, supra note 198, at 1265).
209. This is not just an issue for U.S. courts. Beginning in 2007, a
case seeking legal personhood status for Mathew Hiasl Pan, a
chimpanzee, made its way through the Austrian court system until
the Austrian Supreme Court finally turned down the final appeal,
partially on the grounds that the applicant did not have standing.
A case was then filed in the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). Martin Balluch & Eberhart Theurer, Personhood Trial
for Chimpanzee Mathew Pan, Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, n.d.,
https://www.vgt.at/publikationen/texte/artikel/20080118Hiasl.
htm. However, the outcome of the ECHR case is unclear. The
Spanish Parliament in 2008 passed a resolution granting legal
rights to great apes. Lee Glendinning, Spanish Parliament Approves
Human Rights for Great Apes, The Guardian, June 26, 2008,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/26/humanrights.
animalwelfare.
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Perhaps they will not win. Perhaps the bulldozers of “progress” will plow under all the aesthetic
wonders of this beautiful land. That is not the
present question. The sole question is, who has
standing to be heard? Those who hike the Appalachian Trail into Sunfish Pond, New Jersey,
and camp or sleep there, or run the Allagash in
Maine, or climb the Guadalupes in West Texas,
or who canoe and portage the Quetico Superior
in Minnesota, certainly should have standing
to defend those natural wonders before courts
or agencies, though they live 3,000 miles away.
Those who merely are caught up in environmental news or propaganda and flock to defend
these waters or areas may be treated differently.
That is why these environmental issues should
be tendered by the inanimate object itself. Then
there will be assurances that all of the forms
of life which it represents will stand before the
court—the pileated woodpecker as well as the
coyote and bear, the lemmings as well as the
trout in the streams. Those inarticulate members of the ecological group cannot speak. But
those people who have so frequented the place
as to know its values and wonders will be able
to speak for the entire ecological community.210

Unfortunately, Justice Douglas was writing
for the dissent. Looking into the future, the personhood movement might achieve standing for
animals. For now, the interests of animals, like
those of other environmental elements, can only
be litigated by people who can establish standing.

210. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-52 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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